Reclaiming the Successful: A Mission for Friends of BJP

Swapan Dasgupta had attended our Bangalore event, and was also present in Ahmedabad. After the Bangalore event, he wrote a blog post that very much echoes some of the things we would like to accomplish via the Friends of BJP movement:

The phrase “secession of the successful” has often been used to describe the non-involvement of India’s professional classes–those who are the driving forces of a globalised economy–in politics. The reasons are well known and don’t need to be repeated.

This Lok Sabha election, a section of the media, has been attempting to change things by at least forcing the young, the upper middle classes and the cynical classes to at least go out and vote. The assumption is that a substantial turnout may prompt political parties to may more heed to those they had earlier brushed aside as the non-voting classes.

I spent Saturday in Bangalore (I still can’t get myself to writing or saying Bengaluru) with Arun Jaitley to see a group of young enthusiasts, who work under the banner of Friends of BJP, in action. A group from Mumbai, notably Rajesh Jain and Amit Malviya, had taken time off from work to help the BJP reach out to young PLUs–those who otherwise follow Barack Obama’s campaign more enthusiastically than Indian politics.

…

I see an initiative such as FOBJP in two ways. In this election season, it can play a role in bringing out the otherwise apathetic middle-class vote. The group can expose a small group of Indians to the delights of organising and interacting with other like-minded individuals. FOBJP, I feel, is not merely aimed at the young. It must target all those who feel for India but shy away from politics.

There is a second, post-election dimension to the FOBJP. If the initiative dies at the end of the campaign, only to be resurrected the next time a Lok Sabha is elected, it would be a lot of wasted energy.

I believe FOBJP should become a permanent forum for all those who see themselves as BJP voters. They should act as a permanent watchdog/pressure group to ensure that the party doesn’t forget its supporters.

Hitherto, the party has emphasised its karyakartas, i.e. the activists. It has not demonstrated a similar willingness to either hear or explain things to those who vote for the party and identify with it.

The FOBJP must remain a ready-made forum for party. It must alert the party to possibilities, warn against stupidities and debate the issues. The constant interaction between a party and its social base will enrich democracy.

I hope some of those who are in the FOBJP take up and improve on my suggestion. Among all the political parties, the BJP is the most democratic. We must now use democracy to improve the quality of the party.

What do you think?

March 29, 2009 | Filed Under Swapan Dasgupta | 7 Comments 

Ahmedabad Event: Press Coverage

Another overflowing auditorium! We had 800+ people come for the Ahmedabad Event yesterday evening. A big thanks to Devang Nanavati and his team for putting up a great show. Here are some articles from the press coverage.

The Times of India writes:

After the UPA government failed to provide security to domestic tournaments, India is now being equated with Pakistan when it comes to organising sports events in the country.

This was said by BJP Rajya Sabha MP and national general secretary Arun Jaitley at a function here organised by Friends of BJP. After the government failed to provide security to IPL, countries likes Australia are threatening to withdraw from Davis Cup, while Britain has already pulled out from a badminton tournament, he stated.

…

He talked of recession and job loss and went on to elaborate the BJP theory of a weak prime minister.

…

However, after the programme when he was asked about Maya Kodnani’s arrest, he just washed his hands off saying, “Politicians should keep away from commenting on it as it is a matter between an individual and the leader”.

SamayLive writes:

Continuing BJP’s tirade against the government and Prime Minister, BJP general secretary Arun Jaitley today hit out at the UPA on its “mishandling of economic situation and national security”.

Jaitley, who was here to attend a programme organised by newly floated “Friends of BJP” organisation by young professionals, said like Pakistan, this government also “lives in denial.” In his address, the key strategist of the saffron party lashed out at Congress and its alliance partners for its “vote bank politics” and “failure” in the area of national security, IPL, economy and performance. He also termed it a “weak government and leadership.” He said when the elections were announced, Congress leadership thought that it was clearly a front runner in the polls, but within two weeks, political landscape has changed in the country and now Congress has become “underdog” from the front runner.

Our next stop: Lucknow on Sat, April 4. And more to come!

March 29, 2009 | Filed Under Events | 14 Comments 

The Digital Connection

by Rajesh Jain

Two journalists called me earlier in the week wanting to talk about the role of the Internet and mobile in the Elections. Here is a summary of the points I made:

At the end of the day, these are tools and channels. They are not a substitute for the manifesto, leadership and organisation. To use modern tools and channels when the manifesto, leadership and organisation are not in sung with the modern idiom will have limited impact, probably even less than US 2000. Finally, one must ask why the manifesto, leadership and organisation are not modern? Could it just be that the assumptions behind voter behaviour are not correct, and actually changing rapidly, while the political discourse (i.e. manifesto, leadership and organisation) has not kept pace? That is my hope.

March 28, 2009 | Filed Under Rajesh Jain | 5 Comments 

Responding to the Economic Meltdown

Some lessons for South Asia

by Arun Shourie

(The Asian Development Bank recently organised a meeting in Manila of central bank governors, ministers and senior finance officials from South Asia to consider the impact of the economic meltdown, and possible responses. Michel Camdesus, former managing director of the IMF delivered the opening address, former Union minister Arun Shourie the closing address. This is the text.)

Several features about the current economic crisis stand out. The first, of course, is the sheer scale of what preceded it, and the magnitude of what has happened in its wake: to recall a typical fact, in a recent lecture, Andrew Sheng mentions that, on the eve of the breakdown, the nominal value of financial derivatives and exchange traded derivatives had soared to fourteen times the world’s GDP.

The second feature is the pace of wealth destruction in this round: as has been observed, there has scarcely been another period of four to five months in which almost fifty trillion dollars worth of wealth has been wiped out.

Third, as several observers have pointed out, the breakdown differs from the Southeast Asian crisis in other respects also: that crisis was on the periphery of the world economic system; this one has originated in, and has thus far most severely struck the very heart of the system. The result makes demands of its own: as the Southeast Asian economies went into a tailspin, the OECD economies held up; this helped the recovery of the former as they were able to resume exports to the latter. This buoy is not available this time round: while some of our economies may be able to resume growth only when the US, European and Japanese economies come out of the recession, we will have to depend on our own efforts. This is all the more so as governments, pressed by job losses at home, will, overtly or covertly, adopt protectionist measures. As a lemma, the same proposition holds for China: it is idle to expect, as commentators kept saying in the last quarter of 2008, that China would shore up other economies. China is focusing its efforts on reorienting its economy towards domestic demand, domestic requirements, domestic employment: the “stimulus” this effort may provide for other economies will only be a residual.Fourth, the world has turned out to have become much more intertwined than experts had pronounced it to be. Economies are much more inter-linked, sectors within an economy like India are much more interdependent than had been presumed. How contrived the declarations of October/November last year look just four/five months later – that our economies will not be affected as the “fundamentals” of our economies are strong, as our economies are, in effect, “decoupled” from western economies. Our economies are linked to others through exports of goods as well as services, through remittances, through foreign inflows – through monies that have come in for arbitrage even more so than as direct investment. But more than any of these, our economies are linked with those of US, Japan and Europe through that all-pervasive intangible – confidence. Yes, particular banks and firms have been thrown into difficulties. Yes, there is shortage of liquidity. But the real blow has been to confidence – that is the tsunami that has traveled all the way to our shores. Till confidence is restored, things will not begin to turn around. And notice that as yet, the 4 trillion dollars notwithstanding, nothing that the governments of the US, Europe or Japan have done has shored up confidence.

That is one reason why the periodic declarations, “We expect recovery from the third quarter of 2009/ from the first quarter of 2010…,” are just that much whistling in the dark.

In spite of the scale of the breakdown; in spite of the pace at which wealth has been destroyed; in spite of the fact that nothing that has been done thus far – and what has been done this time round is far greater in magnitude than in any other crisis in decades – has shored confidence, in spite of these features, Government after government has underestimated the impact that the crisis is certain to have on its economy. Indeed, several governments – and the Government of India is a prime example – have been in denial. The tsunami has hit countries successively. But, till the penultimate moment, each has convinced itself that the tsunami has passed at a safe distance.

The first lesson is not to remain in denial. Governments must anticipate. They must react at lightning speed. They must overwhelm. The old adage is indeed apt: hope for the best but prepare for the worst. A lemma is: do not be lulled into relaxing your effort by blips: that in Pakistan’s case remittances have, in fact, increased a bit in the last two months may well be due to the fact that workers who are being laid off in the Middle East are repatriating their savings in one go; that automobile sales in India have gone up in January may well be due to some transient factors… Hence, instead of clutching at these straws, prudence dictates that we assume that developed countries will take five to seven years to return to the status quo ante, and devise our responses accordingly.

Nature of the stimulus
The view has been urged, “Our deficit is our stimulus.” Such claims are a symptom: the current crisis is being used by many governments, the Government of India is again a prime example, to cover up the results of mismanagement during the period preceding the crisis. Financial profligacy is what caused the deficits in India, for instance, not some prescience about the impending breakdown. Unchecked, poorly targeted subsidies on food and fertilizers; on petroleum products; a massive waiver of agricultural debts; pay rises for government staff – these three items are what pushed the combined deficit of central and state governments in India to over 11 per cent of the country’s GDP. Not only were these outlays way beyond what prudence would have allowed, they were grossly under-budgeted: the provision for food and fertilizer subsidies was at least a third less than what would manifestly be required; the POL subsidies were kept out of the Budget calculations all together; as were the outlays on the massive increases in governmental salaries.

The assertion, “The deficit is our stimulus,” presumes that our economies are today suffering from the classic Keynesian deficiency of demand. That is far from being the case. Not a generalized deficiency of demand but a breakdown of confidence – this is what is causing industry to hold back on investment, it is what is causing even consumers to hold back on purchases. And that is precisely why cuts in rates of interest, cuts even in taxes are not triggering the surge in investments and purchases that policy makers have assumed would follow: how can the fact that a person will have to pay 2 per cent less as interest lead him to go in for a house when he is not sure whether he will have his job two months from now?

Prior profligacy limits a country’s ability to deal with the crisis. And profligacy today limits its ability to deal with the crisis as it continues into next year. Today the countries that have reserves, that have fiscal headroom, that have the ability to execute massive infrastructure projects – these are the countries that are in a better position to navigate the crisis. When investors and others see that their government is unable to bring its expenditures to heel, their confidence in the future is further damaged. And there is the real effect too: in India, with governmental borrowing of Rs. 3600 billion having become inescapable in 2009/2010, the State will be pre-empting the private sector from the market, it will be pre-empting the very sector on which it is coming to rely not just for executing infrastructure projects but even for financing them. A return to fiscal discipline, therefore, is necessary precisely for meeting the crisis.

There is another reason for this. The crisis is no longer a generalized one. By now it is sector-specific. It is location-specific. It is firm-specific. Units in Tirupur in Tamil Nadu producing garments for exports have been hit hard. By the time the stimulating effects of a general deficit will reach Tirupur, an age would have passed.

Moreover, jobs are not malleable. Establishments in the gems and jewelry business have had to cut down operations drastically in Gujarat. Assume that, through deficits, the Government finances public works in Bihar or even in Surat. How many diamond cutters will be inclined to or even be able to avail of them?

To be of help the relief must be in the locality and in the industry that has been hit. Faced with a sudden fall in purchases of trucks, the commercial vehicles sector will be helped not when the Government goes in for an even larger general-purpose deficit but when it decides to expedite procurement of trucks for the country’s defence forces.

The same goes for individual firms. To pluck an example from India, the very firms that were the pride of the country yesterday as they acquired firms abroad are in danger today: several of them acquired the foreign firms with substantial borrowings. Today, with the collapse of markets, the fall in commodity prices, the evaporation even of working capital, they are finding it difficult to service their obligations. That constitutes a twofold problem for the country. First, at the very time that foreign funds have been withdrawn – close to 70 billion dollars in the last six months – about $ 53 billion short term debt has to be serviced – either through repayment or through renewal – in the coming year. Second, a failure of even one of these firms will not just be a problem for that firm, it will be yet another blow to confidence in general. In a word, governments should be planning not just general packages but location-specific, industry-specific and firm-specific relief.

While doing so, governments must keep the inarticulate in mind also. With sources of external commercial borrowing having dried up, Indian corporates, for instance, will be turning to Indian banks and the Indian market. The small and medium establishments, already hit by the sudden and extreme risk-aversion that has seized our banks like banks elsewhere, will now be squeezed out completely. Yet, as a recent McKinsey study reminds us, this is a massive sector. It accounts for 40 per cent of manufacturing output, that is about 17 per cent of the country’s GDP. It accounts for close to 44 per cent of exports. Most important, it employs close to 30 million people. Closures and lay-offs in this sector will be diffused. But they will be of an order that, if unattended, can trigger social unrest.

For the same set of reasons, governments should be alert to early signs of stress even in sectors that are conventionally regarded as strong. In India, for instance, it is generally assumed, and quite rightly so, that our banking sector is safe as it has been conservative. It has made substantial progress in bringing down non-performing loans to just about 2 per cent of its outstandings. But recent studies – by Chetan Ahya and Ridham Desai of Morgan Stanley, by Joydeep Sengupta and Anu Madgavkar of McKinsey – remind us other that there are facets also: about 40 per cent of corporate India’s asset base has a return on incremental capital that is lower than the cost of capital; and Indian banks have lent $ 100 billion to these vulnerable firms – loans that account for a fifth of total bank loans. In a word, take no sector for granted. Identify the vulnerable units in each sector, and prepare contingency plans for them – remembering always that a collapse of any constituent of any sector will impair the most important variable that is needed for revival, the very variable that is most fragile today – namely, confidence in general.

In such environment general deficits will be as much of a stimulus as throwing money out of the window. The stimuli which will really help are ones that strengthen the viability, sustainability, and competitiveness of the economy for the long run — that is, for the time when this particular crisis would have passed and the economy would be back to its normal course. A good example of this kind, for instance, is the announcement in the US that it will be deploying a good bit of its stimulus plan towards creating a green infrastructure. Outlays to create alternate energy which liberate economies like those of South Asia from their current dependence on imported Oil supplies; expenditures to multiply and enlarge manifold the current facilities available for higher and technical education, facilities which would overcome the extreme shortage of technical personnel in these countries would be examples of the same kind. An excellent initiative, one that we should emulate, is available from Singapore. The Government has launched a plan under which a person losing his job can enroll in an institution for acquiring higher skills than the ones that are required for his existing job. He is paid a stipend for every day that he attends a class for five hours of class. When the current downturn is behind us, the person will be able to seek a job which is better paying and which demands more of him than the job that he has just lost.

The crucial variable here is the ability of the country to execute these projects expeditiously. This is why China is way ahead of, say, the typical South Asian country. To begin with, it has $ 2 trillion of reserves. With these it can finance massive infrastructure projects – an option that is not available to a country like India which, through the Government’s profligacy of the past three years, has robbed itself of fiscal headroom. Equally important, China has large supplies of engineers and skilled personnel – because of the extensive programmes which it had implemented earlier for both, training engineers as well as for upgrading vocational skills. With those two trillion dollars it can also, as it is doing, acquire mineral and other resources in other parts of the world, the resources that it will need for its long-term growth. Most important, China has a shelf of projects which it can start implementing forthwith: many of these projects had been prepared to the last detail as long ago as 2005. Several of them were kept in abeyance, in a sense, as it was felt that the economy was overheating. Now they can be implemented without any delay. And that is possible because China has overcome the customary obstacles which hold up the execution of projects in countries such as ours. It has acquired an unmatched capacity to implement projects expeditiously. In our case, apart from implementing such projects as can be implemented now, the current crisis is yet another occasion to make every effort to acquire the ability and resources to improve the capacity to implement projects more expeditiously in the future.

Why not start straightaway? Institute massive rewards for firms and local and provincial governments that expedite the implementation of projects? Institute tax rebates for companies which, instead of laying off workers, retain them and have them acquire better skills?

A role for the ADB
And this points to a vital role which an institution like the Asian Development Bank can discharge at this moment. Andrew Sheng and others justifiably remind us of the curious charge that has been put out – namely, that countries of Asia have exacerbated the current crisis by their excessive savings, that the current crisis has been made possible, indeed that it has been intensified by what have been called “global imbalances”. This is one of those predictable surprises. Our countries were being hectored incessantly that we should increase our savings rate. And now we are being told that, because we have done so, we have contributed to intensifying the existing crisis! But, for a moment, take this charge at face value. The cure is obvious. The cure to “global imbalances,” it has been rightly said, is to develop the capacity within Asia to use our savings here.

In addition to improving our capacity to implement projects within our countries, we should enhance our capacity to implement cross-country, regional projects. There are a large number of such projects which can be implemented, but which have been languishing for reasons that are as remediable as they are well-known. Setting up power projects in Nepal from which power is sold mostly to India; setting up projects to exploit the natural gas resources of Bangladesh from which a large proportion of gas would be sold to India – these projects have not got off the ground for decades because undertaking them has become a political issue within Nepal and Bangladesh. This is where the Asian Development Bank, with the trust which countries in the region repose in its fairness, and in its objectivity and expertise, can play a vital role. It should, for instance, draw up the terms and conditions which would be best for Nepal and would be fair to India for implementing power projects in that country.

This is the role which would be more appropriate than to expend time and effort in setting up yet another institution. As is customary in the wake of every crisis, today also proposals are being advanced for setting up new institutions. Shouldn’t we set up an institution for regional monitoring? Shouldn’t we set up an arrangement, a regional fund for helping our countries tide over such crises? Our experience with new institutions in response to crises has been, that, ten years after they have been set up to deal with the problem, the problem remains as it was, and the institution has become a new problem. Therefore, instead of going in for more institutions, an organisation like the ADB should use its influence and expertise and acceptability to persuade governments to at last start implementing cross-country projects.

Reforms
The current crisis has triggered a sort of triumphalism among those who have traditionally opposed reforms in our countries. “See,” they say, “capitalism has failed; liberalization and opening up of the economy, integration with the world has brought all these problems upon us.” Therefore, they are pressing, not just a halt to further reforms, but for a reversal of many of them. With this logic in hand, we should just have remained at the hunting and gathering stage. Had we only done so, none of the crises that afflict countries periodically would have touched us at all! The lesson is the opposite one. Every circumstance, every arrangement, every new setup opens up new opportunities just as it also occasions new problems. We should not, for that reason, shy away from reforms and progress. The lesson is to institute such correctives and reforms as the new circumstances demand. One of President Obama’s advisers has a good maxim: “No crisis should be allowed to go waste”. In the current circumstances also, the people, as well as governments will be prepared to take measures today which they would not have taken in normal times. The new circumstance should, therefore, be used to affect improvements that are necessary in the light of the crisis as it has unfolded, and at the same time to institute those reforms which will enable our countries to adopt policies and implement projects more expeditiously – policies and projects which, as we noted above, will strengthen the viability, competitiveness and sustainability of our societies for the future.

But all this is contingent on our having clear-headed, competent, purposeful, strong governments. This is the real deficit, the real crisis in our societies – apart from the advance that has been registered in Sri Lanka of overcoming the terrorist threat, and apart from the steady hands that guide Bhutan, governments in South Asia are losing grip as well as legitimacy. No stimulus package, no slew of economic reforms can survive the wreckage of governance.

Considerations that go beyond countries
One of the important features about the current crisis is that the breakdown has not come about because of one rogue, not even because of a handful of rogues. This is not the work of a Harshad Mehta or a Madoff. Entire industries have been involved in bringing about this collapse. Mortgage salesmen, banks, financial analysts, chartered accountants, auditors, rating agencies, regulators, central bankers and the governments – what has happened is the joint product of one and all of them. I’m reminded of a phrase which Joseph Berliner had used to describe the inability over decades of Soviet planners to get at the facts about individual enterprises. The reason, he said, was that from the bottom – the shop-floor of the factory – to the top – the provincial and central planning bodies – everyone had a vested interest in exaggerating the production figures and minimizing the quantities of raw material that had been used to produce the particular item. The reason, he wrote, was that functionaries all along the line were knit in “interlocking webs of mutual complicity.” These “interlocking webs” of the complicit are precisely what account for the current breakdown. For that reason, merely adding one more twist to a regulation or even to the law; merely setting up another institution which in the end comes to work in the same way as the existing institutions – such steps will not do.

For we must examine how this mountain of sand swelled to such proportions and “no one noticed.” We must reflect on the ease with which what was good for a few got dressed up as being good for all. We must reflect how warnings, even protests, some of them from leading statesmen of Asia itself, were disregarded. In fact, they were drowned in the general applause and acclamation of “financial innovation” which was said to be taking place. We must reflect how, in fact, regulations were enacted in countries like the U.S. but were not enforced. We must recall how, at crucial turns, regulations were, in fact, relaxed.

There were several reasons why all this happened. For the present purpose recalling just two of them will suffice. First, the beneficiaries, for instance the investment bankers, had acquired the position and “the intellectual stature” of referees. They were interlinked with advisers, analysts, rating agencies, and ultimately with the regulators. That is how what was good for them came to be dressed up as being good for all. Similarly, several governments and central bankers, as is now acknowledged even by some of the prime actors themselves, blew into the bubble and made it swell even more. The reason was that they took the resulting rise in asset values as certificates for their performance, they took them to be evidence of the correctness of their policies and as proof of the confidence which markets all over the world reposed in them personally.

After all, it is not that warnings were lacking. It is not the case that everyone was convinced that the innovations were all for the good. All of us today recall the statement of Warren Buffet – about an entire category of these innovative instruments being “Weapons of Mass Destruction”. We recall the warnings of Naseem Talib, of Roubini, of Jeremy Grantham. The point to reflect is, “How is it that these warnings went unheeded? How did they get drowned?”

The second point to reflect upon is more fundamental: are there features that are inherent in this kind of a financial universe and which make such breakdowns inevitable? Take, for instance, the simple matter of Asset-based Lending. Marry it to the perverse incentive system which became the characteristic of the financial world in the West. Loans would be given on the basis of the value of a category of assets, say houses. As the volume of loans against that category of assets for further investment in that category of assets increased, the value of those assets went up. Accordingly, in the second round, those who could offer those assets as collateral were able to borrow even more against those assets. That in turn raised the value of those assets even higher… And the larger the volume of loans that got made against those assets, the higher the rewards that accrued to those stoking the fire. And notice, the extent to which “innovation” was taken to further this fire: so much so that today the banks themselves, and the companies that ostensibly insured the transactions of those banks do not know the extent, even by a broad order of magnitude, to which they have become exposed to those toxic instruments.

To continue with the current example, so as to safeguard ourselves against future collapses of this kind, we must devise and hone gauges of our own to identify bubbles. And it should be the duty of our governments and central banks to alert our citizens, in particular small, uninformed, retail investors about bubbles that are emerging. Even this recent episode shows that when asset prices rise at the astronomical rate at which they did in the last five years, a bubble is getting formed. Similarly, when transactions come to have little to do with reality, that too is an indication that we should heed. In this last round, for instance, far-fetched and unimaginably esoteric formulae became the basis for millions of dollars to move into and out of “packages”, and countries. The ratio of one currency to another; the ratio of those two currencies to that of another pair of currencies; correlations of absolutely distant variables over whatever stretch of time fit that string of observations… Such determinants became the automatic triggers for transactions. They had nothing to do with what was happening in the underlying sectors, in the firms. When things are reach such a pass, we should know that transactions and instruments have departed so far from reality that they are bound to come down in a crash.

Thus, the spiral and the eventual collapse were inherent in the design itself. But there is an even more basic question that we must ponder. Are the spiral and the subsequent collapse inherent only in a particular sector? Or is it that the economies themselves have got addicted to bubbles? The real estate bubble in one round. The dotcom bubble in the next. The sub-prime and yen-trade bubble in the third…

Therefore, while much has been made of the fact that this breakdown was triggered by a policy failure, the failure to save Lehman Brothers, the fact is that the failure to save Lehman Brothers was just the occasion for what happened subsequently. That failure, to recall an expression used in a very different context, was just “the spark that lit the prairie fire.” The fact that entire sectors collapsed, that entire economies went into a tailspin so swiftly upon the decision not to save a single institution shows that the whole structure had become just a wall of sand. That is what we should reflect on for our future.

Several operational conclusions follow.

A few things to do
First, there is much talk of a new international economic architecture. Unfortunately, once again almost all work on what shape that architecture should take is being done in the very countries, sometimes by the very institutions and personnel whose excesses and misjudgments, to put it no higher, have led to the present pass. But they are, and quite naturally, loath to part with power. They may well let time pass. They may once again busy us in futile debates. And ensure that processes and institutions remain in their control. That would only ensure that the next bubble, and with it the next jolt will not be long in coming. That is all the more likely because, in those societies, the ones whose excesses and greed have led the world into this pit have got away scot-free. Others – tax payers who must pick up the bill for the bailouts, workers who must suffer joblessness – are the ones who are defraying the cost.

Second, we must keep our ears open to the Cassandras. We must not get swept away by intellectual fashions. Certainly, we should not succumb to the urgings of financial wizards and advisers who chastise our countries and governments for not keeping up with innovations that have been adopted “all over the world.”

Third, these events remind us once again that we must think for ourselves. We must be centres of countervailing intellectual, institutional and real economic power. Unless we build up these capacities, we will remain vulnerable to being misled by persons and institutions that have ideas that suit them rather than us, to say nothing of agendas they might have.

It is equally important to nail the culpable. First, we must document and nail the double standards of the West and of international institutions and international advisers. Policymakers in Southeast Asia recall vividly the advice which was thrust down their throats in the late 1990s. “No, no,” they were told, “you must let those who had made mistakes collapse. That is the way the market ensures that the mistakes will not be repeated in the future.” Governments in Southeast Asia, the government even of Japan, the country with the second largest economy of the world, let banks and other firms fail. These were then bought up at throw-away prices by western companies and consortia. And what is the position today? We are told that all rulebooks have to be thrown overboard. We are told that governments must intervene to save the companies and institutions which have done such gross wrongs, which have made such enormous mistakes, which have been propelled by little else than personal greed – we are told that governments just have to intervene and save these institutions at the cost of the taxpayer because, otherwise, the system as a whole will come down. When that was to be the consequence for our countries, no one was prepared to listen. Not just advisers, but institutions on which countries across the world, including our countries are represented insisted that failure was the only instrument for improvement. These double standards continue to this day. How many have spoken out against the protectionist measures which have already been announced by President Obama? Has he not announced that tax reliefs will not be available to firms that outsource their work? Has he not announced that foreign nurses will not be an employed or welcomed? What if the leaders of one of our countries had announced such measures?

For the same reason it is very necessary to document and nail the red-cards and yellow-cards which rating agencies and other monitors keep handing out. How come they were giving triple ‘A’ ratings to institutions and to instruments and to packages which we now see were entirely hollow? Are these not the very rating agencies and monitors that hand out ratings of one kind or another to our firms, indeed even to our countries, ratings that then influence the decisions of investors and thereby move billions of dollars into or out of our countries? We must document their record so that, in future, they command only as much authority as the intrinsic worth of their work deserves.

Conclusions
In a word,

We must grab the crisis by the forelocks, as we would grab time.

Second, by now the remedies have to be sector-specific, location-specific, firm-specific. General-purpose deficits are no answer to the downturn into which we have been pushed.

Third, we must think for ourselves. In particular, we must document the advice that was thrust down our throats over the years.

Fourth, we must focus on working and reforming existing institutions and processes rather than on setting up yet another slew of institutions. For this purpose institutions like the Asian Development Bank, countries like India and others in South Asia should coordinate and sustain intellectual effort.

[1] Andrew Sheng, “From Asian to global financial crisis,” Third K.B. Lall Memorial Lecture, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, 7 February 2009.

(This article was first published on the Indian Express website on March 19, 2009.)

March 28, 2009 | Filed Under Arun Shourie | 4 Comments 

Vajpayee on Advani

We are starting a new section which will carry excerpts from LK Advani’s autobiography “My Country My Life.” We hope this will give you a better perspective on the man who, hopefully, will be India’s next Prime Minister.

“Advaniji’s autobiography, aptly titled My Country My Life closely follows the defining moments of Independent India, including the tragedy of Partition that accompanied the joy of freedom from the British rule. It is a testimony to the innate strength of Advaniji’s personality and character that he surmounted this adversity (partition), just as he would overcome many other adversities in life, to pursue his chosen path. His life is characterised by his qualities of commitment, devotion and determination to face all odds in the course of serving the nation.

We have had our differences on issues and approaches, during the course of our long association (over a half century); however it is not the differences, but the unity of purpose and action, that marked our relationship. Those who have worked or interacted with Advaniji closely know him as a man who never compromised on his core belief in nationalism and yet has displayed flexibility in political responses whenever it was demanded by the situation. He has an open mind that always absorbs new ideas from diverse sources and he has made an enduring contribution to a vigorous public debate on genuine secularism and the main roots of our nationhood.

Through his autobiography, Advaniji has added another special accomplishment to his life. It is the remarkable journey of a sensitive human being and an outstanding leader whose best, I hope and pray, is yet to come.”

Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Prime Minister of India, 1998-2004

March 27, 2009 | Filed Under Memoirs - L K Advani | 4 Comments 

Delhi Event: Press Coverage

We had a super event in Delhi yesterday evening. The FICCI auditorium was packed, with people sitting in the aisles and right in the front - and a few hundred people outside who unfortunately could not get in. Thanks to everyone for coming, and the Delhi team led by Manoj Arora for making it such a grand success. Next stops: Ahmedabad (Sat, Mar 28) and Lucknow (Sat, Apr 4). And more to come!

Here is some of the press coverage on the Delhi Event.

Indian Express has a detailed story on the event including quotes from some who attended:

The Bharatiya Janata Party has an unofficial partner in the Lok Sabha elections. With its slogan “Because India deserves better”, ‘Friends of BJP’ is out to popularise the saffron party among the coffee-shop crowd and make it part of daily drawing-room discussions.

Designed on similar lines as the Obama campaign, the forum asks people to register on their SMS channel by sending messages and joining their groups on networking sites. “We are not politicians, we are people like you. We might even not agree with what the BJP says or does. But we feel that it is, at present, the better alternative for a ruling party. Even if the BJP is not the best, it is certainly more promising than the others,” said Manoj Arora, the Delhi convener of the forum.

The group organised a discussion at the FICCI auditorium on Thursday, which was attended by nearly 1,000 people. BJP prime ministerial candidate Lal Krishna Advani’s son Jayant and daughter Pratibha were present too. On April 11, the forum aims to have at least 11,000 households discussing ‘Why BJP?’ in their drawing rooms.

The Telegragh writes:

The Friends of the BJP, a forum of high-flying businessmen and professionals, is trying to create a new urban voter who ultimately becomes the voice of India, knocking the aam aadmi off his poll perch.

This voter will be animated by a passion for economic growth, stronger reforms, national security and good governance.

Instead of the “common man”, the Friends use the term “people like you” to refer to bankers, technocrats, doctors, venture capitalists and the like, who are mobilised through the Internet and text messages and who work out strategies in air-conditioned rooms. The Friends hope their silent movement, born in Mumbai 50 days ago, will become the harbinger of change.

More coverage:

March 27, 2009 | Filed Under Events | 12 Comments 

BJP’s IT Vision: A Critical Review

by Anshuman Goenka

Last week, LK Advani released the BJP’s IT vision with much fanfare in Delhi.  It drew some publicity for a couple of days and a few critiques in some dailies from those who had read the document in full. However, during the week, any discussion on this was completely drowned by bigger challenges - a reported rift between senior leaders of the party, an irresponsible speech by a debut Lok Sabha candidate with a famous name, and the usual theatre of coalition politics.

At the prompting of a few friends, I spent an hour trying to understand what they have put together - as a lay person, since I am no IT expert.  My first reaction was of surprise.  After all, BJP is a political party accused of communal identity politics, led supposedly by a beleaguered octogenarian that could take India back in time and not to the future.  It is curious therefore, that such a document comes from the BJP and not from the original harbingers of IT in the mid-1980s.  It is more curious that this turn is neither worthy of a serious discussion in mainstream media.  One was expecting more discussion on natural questions about whether this was mere lip service (ancillary to the party’s core identity politics) or a serious turn, whether it was feasible, and whether it was sensible policy.  One was also worried about the wisdom of politicians poking their nose in the IT industry which had done as well as it has without any support or meddling.

Getting into the document, I was taken aback at the sweep of the scope - the document begins with a reference about using IT for telemedicine, financial inclusion, governance, new jobs and land records.  A natural skeptic like me wonders whether technology is construed as that magic wand which will be the panacea to all problems in this country.  But, the document then goes to cite specific statistics, quote topic experts (not many of whom are BJP-friendly) and outline next steps.   The second striking feature of the document is its focus on social justice, laptops at Rs 10,000 and special focus for the disadvantaged groups.  Will scale & innovation really be able to push prices low, or will there be backdoor subsidies?  If there is an expanded government expenditure or mass procurement, will there not be obvious leakages?  As a business professional with a belief that government failures are worse than market failures, I dread the thought of more subsidies and cynically see this as the neta’s attempt to win votes.  These remain open questions.  The third remarkable point is reference to citizen identification numbers and digital sovereignty.  The skeptic worries whether this will lead to another avoidable debate on who migrated when from where, and be a source of divide.  Such apprehensions cannot be brushed under the carpet but must be addressed.

One also wonders whether this was really the document one needed.  For the economy, isn’t there a more imperative need to focus on finding some way to revive consumer confidence, business capex and capital flows?  Would the concerns on social justice referred to in the document not be better met by universal primary literacy and primary healthcare ahead of any other goals?  Isn’t police reform more important than identity cards?  Like anybody else, I can think of many other areas that should be equal, if not higher, in competing with this vision for the attention of a new government.

Indeed, there are many places to find faults.  Even if very little of what is said is finally implemented, should one not credit them for the boldness of this document and this initiative, especially ahead of the election, when the number of people who would respond to it are still not considered critical electoral mass?  And can one, at all deny that this is a sharp break from the kind of communal politics that BJP has been accused all along of?  It is unlikely to turn this election, may find only a few votes this time around, and may actually be bettered by a rival party, but if this is any pointer of electoral politics in India in the next decade, that alone makes me very happy.

March 27, 2009 | Filed Under Anshuman Goenka | 5 Comments 

Bubble, Bubble, Toil and Trouble

by Arun Shourie

Several points about this government’s deficit figures are to be borne in mind.First, notice how far the Government has departed from the limits that had been prescribed in the FRBM act, limits that were acknowledged all round to be necessary both as prudence and to maintain our credibility for investors and creditors abroad. That the gross fiscal deficit had climbed to an average of 7.7 per cent of the GDP in the late 1980s had raised alarm all round. Accordingly, under the FRBM legislation it was decided that this ratio must be brought down from 6.2 per cent in 2001-02 to 3 per cent in 2007-08; and that the revenue deficit must be eliminated by March 2008 and a healthy surplus must be built up in the following years. The GDF/GDP ratio will be more than double the target; the revenue account, instead of being a surplus will be in deficit — a deficit close to 5 per cent of GDP. Economists apart, the CAG has been compelled to make severe strictures on the gross irresponsibility that has resulted in these deficits, and charge the government with heaping burdens on future generations. Do you think that will make any difference to these know-it-alls?

Second, the government certainly cannot claim any surprise at deficits having climbed so high. Several commentators outside Parliament; persons like Jaswant Singh, Yashwant Sinha and me, inside Parliament repeatedly showed how the Budgets — in particular the last Budget — were grossly underfunded, and that the country would be saddled with the costs of such subterfuge. To no avail.Third, the deficits have absolutely nothing to do with any planned Keynesian stimulus to the economy. They have arisen wholly from the profligate mismanagement of the preceding three years — in particular, of the last year, 2008-09. In turn, there were two aspects to this dereliction. To begin with, the items on which governmental funds were expended have left next to no capital assets in their wake — they were just populist heads. Furthermore, the resources that were needed to fulfill these populist commitments were grossly understated. They were understated deliberately and for a purpose: so that the government could claim that it was adhering to its obligations under the FRBM Act. The subsidies on fertilisers and petroleum, the amounts that would be required for the debt waiver, the incidence of the pay commission — items that figured in the Budget itself, items that were well known — were just left out of account. It is on the basis of such concealments that the government claimed, as Chidambaram did in his Budget speech of February 2008, “Honourable members will note that not only will I achieve the target for fiscal deficit under the FRBM Act, I have also left for myself some headroom. In the case of revenue deficit, I will meet the target of annual reduction of 0.5 per cent.”

Far indeed from being a stimulus, the deficits have by now foreclosed options: they have left little room for the stimuli that are needed. The prime minister’s own economic advisory council says as much. “The pre-existing high levels of debt and fiscal stress also limit the available headroom for a counter-cyclical thrust of fiscal policy,” it states in its Review of the Economy, 2008-09. “In the prevailing situation re-prioritisation of government expenditure and speedy implementation of already funded projects at the Central and state levels are critical for the fast revival of the economy.” Any evidence of “re-prioritisation of government expenditure”? Any evidence of steps to ensure “speedy implementation of already funded projects”? In fact, the enormous quantum of borrowing that the fiscal profligacy of the last three years has made unavoidable for the coming year — estimated to be well over Rs. 3,60,000 crore — squeeze the options further. Not only will the government have little money to fund ambitious infrastructure projects, this level of borrowing will leave little for borrowing by the private sector on whom the government is depending more and more for financing as well as executing these projects. With overseas sources having dried up, large Corporates are turning to our banks. And so the only consequence will not just be that there will be less for infrastructure projects, the small and medium enterprises will find it that much more difficult to finance their operations. They would have been pre-empted at the banks by the large corporates.

Indeed, precious time was wasted all along: recall the endless discussions on whether some part of mounting foreign exchange reserves should be used for leveraging an infrastructure fund; recall the tardy, not to say stately pace at which schemes such as that to fund “viability gaps” of projects were handled; recall how nothing but nothing was done either to build up the much-talked about shelf of projects, nor to institute incentives for rapid execution of projects that had been approved.

Fourth, alarming as these deficit figures are, they are almost certainly underestimates even now, and doubly so. As has been pointed out, on the one hand the growth of nominal GDP is liable to be less than the Budget assumes, and, on the other, so are the revenue proceeds. Even that is not the end of the story. The deliberate understatement for 2008-09 and the deliberate underestimation for the coming year continue. To cite just one instance, the Business Standard ( February 20, 2009) has nailed how the fertiliser subsidy has been understated. The subsidy payable for 2008-09 is Rs. 102,000 crore. It has been shown to be Rs. 75,847crore. Wonder of wonders, for the coming year, it has been shown to fall to Rs. 50,000 crore! As the paper has pointed out, not only is some of the subsidy due this year liable to spill over into next year, even if prices of fertilisers fall, the fall is liable to be offset by the depreciation of the rupee.

Fifth, such gross departures from what Parliament has mandated raise the question, “What exactly is Parliament approving when it approves the Budget?” For 2008/09, the revised estimate for the gross fiscal deficit is two and a half times the Budget estimate; that for the revenue deficit is nearly four and a half times the Budget estimate. Net borrowing by the government is liable to be two and a half times the budgeted figure. Indeed, as has been pointed out by observers, it is Rs. 40,000 crore more than the borrowing figure that was announced just a week before the Budget. At 182 per cent, 132 per cent, 125 per cent, 85 per cent, the figures for subsidies, pensions, total revenue non-plan expenditure, defence expenditure respectively — to take just a few examples from among the bulkier heads — bear no relation to what the Parliament approved.

TRANSPARENCY: The CAG’s report which was tabled in Parliament on February 20 2009 documents at length what it calls “opaqueness in government accounts.” There are “significant deficiencies” in the accuracy, completeness and transparency of the accounts, it states. Eight “important statements” which four years ago the twelfth finance commission had said must be included in the Union finance accounts, are still not included. The inclusion has been “accepted in principle,” the government tells the CAG. “The process of consultation is on,” it tells him. The actual inclusion “would be a time consuming exercise.”

We get a glimpse of what is happening in the meanwhile. In 2007-08, the Centre transferred Rs. 51,260 crore directly to “autonomous bodies, societies and non-governmental organisations” ostensibly for implementing centrally sponsored schemes. What happened to these fifty one thousand two hundred and sixty crore rupees? “The aggregate amount of the unspent balances in the accounts of the implementing agencies kept outside government accounts is not readily ascertainable,” the CAG records.

Furthermore, CAG finds that fifty per cent of the total expenditure listed under 28 major heads of the government accounts, an amount of Rs. 20,273 crore has been lumped under a minor head, “other expenditure”. “This indicates a high degree of opaqueness in the accounts,” the CAG observes in characteristic understatement. Giving further examples, the CAG concludes, “This shows that the existing structure of the government accounts does not truly reflect the current activities of the government in these ministries/departments.”

The CAG contrasts the original provisions that were approved by Parliament when Chidambaram presented the Budget for 2007-08 with the supplementary provisions that government had to present within a few months. The supplementary provisions were 143 per cent of the original provisions in the case of the civil aviation Ministry; 1378 per cent (yes, 1378) in the case of the department of economic affairs; 10,761 per cent (yes, 10,761) for the ministry of labour and employment; 718 per cent for the ministry of petroleum and natural gas. Such large discrepancies are due to “unrealistic Budget assumptions,” the CAG points out.

Is this accountability? Is it responsible budgeting? Look at the myth we live by: on the one hand, we follow the obsolete British convention that a cut of just a rupee in any item in the Budget must cause the government to resign, and, on the other, governments so casually disregard what Parliament bound them to do. And yet, the budget is but a symptom of the way economic policies have been managed in the last five years. Reforms were left to rot. The “dream team” insinuated that the Communists were not letting them do anything. The responsibility actually rests with that team itself. The “team” exemplifies a type: persons who believe in nothing. For commitment to a cause — say, reforms — does not mean that one makes the occasional speech on it. Commitment is measured by what you are prepared to stake for that objective.

The stoppage of reforms prepared the ground for the slowdown. And the exact repetition of what had been done in the mid-1980s sealed it. Prices started rising, in part because of shortages of specific commodities, in part because of erratic announcements and policies — recall how food stocks were allowed to run down to dangerous levels; recall the announcements and reversals of announcements on imports of wheat and other commodities. Prices rose. Instead of attending to the specific problems and shortages that were triggering the rise, the government, exactly as had been done in the mid-1980s, wielded the axe of monetary policy: interest rates were raised, CRR was raised. These measures choked growth without reining prices in swiftly enough.

By early 2008, anyone who traveled to factories and industrial estates could see that the momentum was petering out. By March, a minister of the government itself had acknowledged in answer to a question in Parliament that 25 lakh jobs had been lost in three sectors alone. As the tsunami of the financial crisis rose, Chidambaram and Manmohan Singh, and sundry chota-motas of the government stood firm — on denial. “Our fundamentals are strong,” they declared. Had the fundamentals of the Southeast Asian economies collapsed? Had the fundamentals of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico collapsed when their economies went into a tailspin? Indeed, has anything happened to the fundamentals of the US, Japan, European countries today? But “our fundamentals are strong” it was.

Next, the country was fed — and, I am so sorry to say, leading economic papers broadcast this nonsense — “We are effectively decoupled.” Decoupled? Twenty per cent of the GDP, which is what our exports are by now, is no inconsiderable figure. Remittances are over $ 45 billion. Even a fool could see that the slowdown in the Middle East, in the West would lower this figure. Similarly, IT earnings are close to $ 50 billion: how could they remain unaffected when some of the largest clients of our companies were literally collapsing? Even more than these interconnections, we are intertwined with developments elsewhere because of the overriding determinant: confidence. That knows no boundaries. The way our markets would every day mimic what had begun to happen to Nikkei in the morning, and what had happened to the Dow overnight was a daily reminder of this. But so were eruptions in the “real” economy: the fact that importers abroad were not honouring their letters of credit; the fact that they were not lifting goods that had reached their ports; the cancellation of orders… But “decoupled” it was. And then, superciliousness, not to say piety, was made policy. “Just casino capitalism,” Manmohan Singh said as he returned from Japan. Vital months were lost.

PUFFING UP THE BUBBLE: Such dereliction is in itself a crime against the country. But there has been more than dereliction: the government actively fed the bubble as it swelled, and then decreed measures that accelerated the downswing. To take just one instance, in Parliament and outside, my good friend Bimal Jalan warned more than once that the soaring ascent for which the government was taking credit was a bubble, that it just could not, and would not be sustained. With dividends having been exempted from taxes; with interest rate differentials having become what they had; with higher and higher institutional inflows chasing a small range of equities and the resulting sharp increases in stock values; with the appreciation of the rupee, a person abroad could shift money to India, earn a 100 per cent return, and take his money out. It doesn’t take rocket science to see that this just cannot be sustained, Bimal warned repeatedly.

Others gave similar warnings. Chetan Ahya and Ridham Desai wrote a series of analytical reports in which they pointed out how the entire bubble had come to swell merely because of foreign inflows, and, in these, on inflows from the most fickle segment among foreign investors, the institutional investors. In emerging economies other than India, foreign direct investment is around 75 to 85 per cent of foreign inflows, they pointed out, and institutional portfolio inflows are around 25 to 15 per cent. In India’s case though, the proportions were running at just the opposite levels. These inflows reached unprecedented levels: whereas in 2001-03, India received around $ 10 billion a year as foreign inflows; in 2007-08 it received $ 107 billion. Sarkari propagandists claimed this testified to the excellence of the government’s policies. In fact, as Bimal and others were pointing out, it was just arbitrage money. These inflows were what fueled the easy credit cycle: in the last five years, credit creation grew at a rate double that of nominal GDP. The swing was bound to reverse.

But who would listen? Certainly not “internationally famous economists”, certainly not “dream teamers”.

By October 2008 it seemed that those in authority were active participants in the market: it really will be instructive to juxtapose their announcements with the gyrations of the market in the latter half of 2008. Absolutely inexplicable steps were decreed. As everyone was pulling his money out, as there wasn’t even a remote chance that amounts would be brought into India, P-notes were suddenly sanctioned again: this in the wake of the national security advisor having warned that terrorist money was coming into the stock market, that the strictest inquiries must be made about who is bringing in money lest our financial system is destabilised, lest funds brought in anonymously are utilised for financing anti-India operations. Not just that, even as other countries moved to stop short-selling, the government allowed it to continue. Indeed, it went one better: even “naked short-selling” — a nefarious practice which cannot but sharply amplify the amplitude of market swings — was allowed to continue.

I remember our meetings with leading figures from the market as well as leading industrialists. We studied first-hand reports of what was happening all round the country, and tabulated a set of recommendations. The government had no time for any dialogue. We released them in public. During one discussion in the Rajya Sabha, Yashwant Sinha drew attention to these recommendations. Chidambaram’s response was typical: FICCI has given its 10 points, he said; CII has given its 8 points; BJP has its 12-point recommendations. All of them will be examined by government as and when necessary. What loftiness!

That is the attitude that has brought us here. Growth slowed down. Reforms that would ensure future growth, arrested. Infrastructure that future growth requires, at a crawl. Government finances out of synch. Too little being done, too late, to stimulate the economy. The worst of it: the word of India’s government devalued. Not an Interim Budget. An Interment Budget.

(Concluded)

(This article was first published in the Indian Express on March 4, 2009.)

March 27, 2009 | Filed Under Arun Shourie | 1 Comment 

Volunteer Form

We have added a Volunteer Form that you can fill in — will take no more than a couple minutes. We have some ideas that we are putting together that all of us can do in the period from now till the elections — will take us a few days to fine-tine and circulate. For now, here is an earlier document that we had published.

Going ahead, there are two primary focus areas for us: Outreach and Votes. As part of Outreach, we are focusing on three things (a) large public meetings with Arun Jaitley in multiple cities (b) smaller drawing room meetings that each of us can do (c) spreading the message via email/website/SMS/social media. As part of Votes, we need to do on the ground activities on Election Day in our neighbourhood to make sure people actually go out and vote.

More on all of these areas and specific action plans soon!

March 26, 2009 | Filed Under Activities | 21 Comments 

Indian Elections - De-mystified (Part I)

by Gaurang Damani

To a common man there are a lot of unknown factors about an Indian election. This article is an attempt to make the election process easily understood.

We can broadly divide the election into 2 processes viz. Campaigning and Voting Day. The timetable for campaigning begins after the candidate (nominated by a party or an Independent) fills up his/ her nomination form. Then a few days are given for the candidate to withdraw the same, after which the campaigning can officially start.

Elections are fought almost entirely on manpower strength (and money power to a certain extent). Each candidate typically has a team which can be classified as:

CAMPAIGN TEAM

Election In-charge

He is the Coach of the team. As soon as the campaigning starts, the candidate is so tied up with meeting people that it is almost impossible for him/ her to put on the thinking cap. This has to be done by the Election or campaign manager.

Sabha In-charge

Public meetings are extremely important to make the message reach the masses. Typically there is a volunteer who handles the organization of the sabha, like stage, chairs, back-drop, invitation cards, etc! This excludes getting the people to the sabha (because most times that is more difficult than arranging the sabha).

Corner meeting In-charge

Street corners are effective spots, utilized by candidates to spread their message, specially in the evenings. This person can also arrange coffee meetings with NGO’s or society’s.

Path yatra In-charge

This is where the candidate walks or takes the “rath” to reach voters. This volunteer decides on the route and which party workers/ volunteers can be involved where. A variant of this is for BMC elections (which are held over smaller areas), the door-to-door path yatra. The rath/ jeep used for the yatra needs to be decorated with election material.

Permissions In-charge

For sabhas, path yatras and corner meetings, permissions are required from authorities like BMC/ Police/ traffic police. Details like location, exact time, number of participants etc have to be provided. It can be a full time job.

Volunteer In-charge

When local citizens or party workers want to get involved in the campaign, someone must guide them what needs to be done (so that the volunteer is not lost).

Material distribution In-charge

This includes pamplets and voting slips.

Treasurer

Handles the money reporting and Petty Cash to volunteers/ party workers

Scheduler

Lot of requests pour in from various NGO’s, society’s to arrange meetings with the candidate. The Scheduler takes care of the candidate’s calendar.

Office In-charge

One of the most important person in the team. Can also double as a scheduler. He acts as a Messenger of important information to the entire team. He also co-ordinates Pamplet printing; Voters slip printing; booth-wise sorting; Furniture of the office; vehicles (campaign and voting day) and Food for the team members. This person also handles other staff members like Typist and Peons.

Reporting to Election Returning Officer

It is quite important the expense reports are submitted to the Returning office on regular basis, as per the schedule provided by Election Commission of India.

Media In-charge

News releases and events calendar have to be sent out everyday in English/ Marathi/ Hindi/ Gujarati etc. by fax. This gives the media an idea on how the candidate is moving and can give adequate coverage if the daily releases are interesting. Photographer/ Video-grapher has to be appointed, who can send out a picture daily to the media offices. A Media file of newspaper clippings can be maintained to be on the lookout for any adverse stories. The media in-charge may also take care of preparing material for printing of pamplets.

VOTING DAY TEAM

Booth In-charge

A booth is a place where the voter actually goes into vote. This volunteer is in-charge of getting voters down to vote. This is the most important function for the voting day.

Polling Agents In-charge

Inside the voting booth (polling booth), each candidate can have a polling agent (list to be submitted a few days before the election day). This polling agent must verify that the EVM (Electronic voting machine) is not tampered with before voting starts. Can also verify the authenticity of the voter, by asking him/her to produce ID, to avoid bogus voting.

Office In-charge

Voters list files to be used on voting day tables are also to be prepared ahead of time. Tables are arranged at street corners (after requisite permissions) to enable voters to find their names on the voting list. Party symbols can not be used here. Food Packets are also arranged to be dropped inside the polling booth. Co-ordination of vehicles for voting day is important.

CELEBRATION-DAY TEAM

All the above included!

If there are any further questions, please drop a line to ‘Friends of BJP’ and we will be glad to compile an FAQ.

March 26, 2009 | Filed Under Gaurang Damani | 11 Comments 

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